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Abstract
Economists pay more and more attention to knowledge networks and drivers of their
development. Consequently, a rich literature emerged analyzing factors explaining
the emergence of intra-organizational links. Despite substantial work focusing on the
dyad level, only little is known about how and why (global) network structures dif-
fer between technologies or industries. The study is based on a new data source on
subsidized R&D cooperation in Germany, which is presented in detail and discussed
with respect to other types of relational data. A comparison of networks within ten
technologies allows us to identify systematic dierences between basic and applied
research networks.
JEL codes: L14, I28, O38
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1 Introduction
Driven by the need to access external knowledge rms are relying more and more on coop-
eration with other organizations. This has been recognized by researchers, who analyze to
an increasing extent inter-organizational knowledge networks. Prominently, Powell et al.
(1996) show that rms' embeddedness within knowledge networks signicantly in
uences
their economic and innovative success. However, the relation between embeddedness and
economic performance does not always yield positive eects as highlighted by Uzzi (1996).
In addition to studying the eects of knowledge networks, this eld of study is also con-
cerned with factors driving network development. For instance, by focusing on the dyadic
(micro) level ter Wal (2009) and Balland (2010) show empirically that linkages between
organizations are more likely if they are proximate in a geographical, social, or cognitive
dimension.
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likely to miss factors that shape the global structures of knowledge networks. While many
authors have shown that the heterogeneity of industries can explain dierences in the in-
novation process or market structure (see, e.g., Pavitt, 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996),
it is still unknown if, and especially how, these dierences translate into the structure of
particular knowledge networks. First steps in that direction have been taken by Broekel
and Boschma (2010), who argue that dierences in the underlying knowledge bases of
industries in
uence the density of their knowledge networks. Similarly, Graf (2009) puts
forward that characteristics of the search process determine the interaction structure and
therefore the evolution of innovation networks.
With the present study we aim to shed some light on these issues by comparing struc-
tural properties of cooperation networks in ten dierent technologies. While these tech-
nologies dier in multiple manners, our primary focus is on the role of (public) science
organizations within the respective networks and how their embeddedness relates to dif-
ferences in overall network properties. For that, we a develop a taxonomy that gradually
categorizes technologies on a scale ranging from basic to applied research. Subsequently,
global network statistics as well as characteristics of the most central actors are related to
this taxonomy.
The second objective of this paper is to present a detailed description of a new database
on subsidized (and mostly cooperative) R&D projects in Germany. While this database
has already been used for analyses within specic elds, (e.g., Fornahl et al., 2010) a
study comparing dierent technological areas has still been missing. The paper therefore
explicitly discusses issues concerning the handling and usage of this data base for network
studies and relates it to other, commonly used types of relational data, especially patents.
Our ndings highlight that dierences exist between basic and applied research, which
relate global network properties as well as the characteristics of actors holding the most
central positions. Concerning the rst, knowledge networks in basic research are smaller
and consequently more dense, however, they involve more isolates. They are also organized
in a more centralized manner, i.e., the bulk of linkages is concentrated on a few actors.
The most central actors in knowledge networks of applied research are large rms, while
universities are of less relevance compared to public research institutes.
Our study is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a short review of the knowl-
edge network literature and discuss how their structures might depend on characteristics
of the underlying technology. The employed data is described in section 3 and the result-
ing network structures are analyzed in section 4 with the goal of providing a typology of
research areas in Germany. The determinants of actor centrality in these networks are
identied in section 5. Section 6 summarizes our main ndings and points towards future
research.
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The focus of economists on cooperative R&D and the importance of external knowl-
edge sources somewhat shifted during the last decades from a bilateral perspective as in
D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) or in Hagedoorn (2002) to a multilateral or network
view (e.g., Powell et al., 1996). Researchers approach a steadily growing variety of issues
related to rms' embeddedness into knowledge networks. For example, the development of
scientic communities is explored by Barabasi et al. (2002) and Moody (2004). Channels
of technology transfer in general and university-industry relations in particular are inves-
tigated by Balconi et al. (2004). Fleming et al. (2006) and Fleming and Frenken (2007)
use patent data to model the evolution of local clusters, while the structures and charac-
teristics of regional networks are explored in a number of recent studies (ter Wal, 2008;
Graf and Henning, 2009; Graf, 2010). Still, the majority of studies on dierent industries,
technologies, nations, and network types focus on the individual connection (micro level)
and little is known about the structural dierences at the level of the complete network
(macro level).
It is well known that industries dier substantially in their underlying technologies,
with an in
uence on entrepreneurship opportunities, cumulativeness, and appropriabil-
ity of knowledge (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). We argue that such het-
erogeneities are likely to translate into varying structural characteristics of knowledge
networks. For instance, it seems straightforward to assume (but is unproven) that in a
\supplier dominated industry" of Pavitt (1984) large suppliers hold central network po-
sitions. However, do universities hold more central positions in science-based industries'
knowledge networks (e.g., chemicals) although the main application developers are huge
multinational corporations (e.g., Dow Chemicals, BASF, Bayer)?
For the present study we focus on just one dimension, namely the degree to which the
(public) science sector is involved in innovation processes. More precisely, we investigate if
(and how) the location of ten technologies on a continuum from basic to applied research
relates to structural characteristics of their respective knowledge networks.
There are a number of reasons why the degree to which a technology is application
oriented (i.e., its position within a continuum ranging from basic to applied research) can
in
uence the structures of the according knowledge networks. For example, fundamental
dierences in the way new knowledge is created exist between technologies (Asheim and
Coenen, 2005). The mode of innovation generation in basic research implies trial settings,
formal models, and high degrees of codication, which is similar to the `scientic' way of
knowledge creation. This eases the exchange, cooperation, and cross-fertilization between
the industrial and the scientic sector making universities more likely to hold central
network positions. In addition, in science based technologies new knowledge is more
frequently published in public journals and magazines. This makes it easier accessible,
which can reduce obstacles for collaboration (see, e.g., Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995)
eventually leading to more dense networks (Broekel and Boschma, 2010).
Similarly Malerba et al. (2000) dierentiate between generic and specic knowledge,
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edge of a very broad nature" the second describes \knowledge specialized and targeted to
specic applications" (Malerba et al., 2000, p. 392). Depending on the structure of the
public supply of generic or specic (scientic) knowledge, some technologies may rely to
higher degrees on public research organizations.
Technologies also dier with respect to their market vicinity, which is strongly related
to the intensity of rms' engagement in these technologies. We should expect that the
vicinity to the market in
uences the ways in which network relations are formed. For
example, Rowley et al. (2000) show that dense (ego-)networks are more important in
contexts of knowledge exploitation whereas structural holes (Burt, 1992) are important to
draw on a variety of knowledge sources in exploration contexts.
3 Data
3.1 Networks based on R&D subsidies data
In order to construct knowledge networks for dierent technologies, we exploit a new
database on joint R&D projects that were subsidized by the German federal government.
This database allows us to retrieve information on organizations that receive subsidies
and to establish connections between organizations working on joint projects. This type
of information documents linkages at an earlier stage compared to patent data and includes
actors from the private and from the public research sector.1
R&D subsidies are used to stimulate private research in elds that are politically
desirable. In Germany this applies to new technologies and so-called key technologies
that are foremost supported (Fier, 2002). Moreover, policy aims at increasing investments
in R&D because the latter is perceived to be below a desired level. A rich literature
analyzes the eects of R&D subsidies, nding that subsidies impact rms' R&D eorts
(e.g., Busom, 2000; Gorg and Strobl, 2007) and employment growth (e.g., Brouwer et al.,
1993; Koski, 2008), and collaborating and patenting activities (see, e.g., Czarnitzki and
Hussinger, 2004; Czarnitzki et al., 2007). In other words, R&D subsidies are economically
highly relevant.
For the purpose of this paper it is however even more important that R&D subsidies are
increasingly being used to stimulate collaboration activities. There are several reasons why
R&D subsidies are more frequently been awarded to cooperative projects. First of all, some
projects are just too big to be realized by a single actor making cooperation a necessity.
Second, policy tries to stimulate technology transfer from public to private actors, which is
why universities and research organizations are frequently participating. Thirdly, collective
learning processes and knowledge spill-overs are expected from cooperative projects. For
this reason actors have to sign substantive knowledge sharing agreements in order to
receive the subsidies. The relevance of the cooperative element of R&D subsidies has
recently been empirically conrmed by Fornahl et al. (2010).
1ter Wal and Boschma (2009) discuss the pros and cons of the various forms of data collection for the
application of social network analysis in the context of economic geography.
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ing public and private research and development activities with R&D subsidies programs
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007). For example, in 2001 in total 7,227,838,000 Euro were spent on
these measures. In 2008 this sum grew to 9,126,670,000 Euro (BMBF, 2008a). While the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) is the primary source of this type of
funding, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) and the Federal Min-
istry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) contribute as well.
In addition to the federal ministries, the ministries of the federal states provide signicant
subsidies programs. Nevertheless, the federal level is still more important (Hassink, 2002).
The above mentioned ministries publish comprehensive information on the supported
projects in the so-called \Foerderkatalog" (subsidies catalog), which is accessible via the
website www.foerderkatalog.de. It lists detailed information on more than 110,000 indi-
vidual grants that were supported between 1960 and 2009. Amongst this information are
a grant's starting and ending date, a title including a very short description, the granting
sum, the name and location of the receiving organization, the name and location of the
executing organization, as well as a classication number. In the following some of these
information are explained in more detail.
The dierentiation between receiving and executing organization applies primarily to
large organizations with several sub-units. In particular universities and research organi-
zations fall into this category. While the university is the grant receiving organization, a
particular chair, faculty, or institute maybe the actual executing unit. The same holds
for large public research organizations like the Max-Planck-Society, which is the receiving
organization and its dierent institutes are the executing units. This dierentiation will
be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
The classication number (in German \Leistungsplansystematik") is an internal clas-
sication scheme developed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF) and consists of 16 main classes, which, for example, include biotechnology, energy
research, sustainable development, health and medicine. These main classes are disaggre-
gated into a varying numbers of sub-classes. These are considerably ne-grained as they
allow for instance the dierentiation between photonics (class: I25020), and optoelectron-
ics (class: I25010) or plant genomics (K04210) and micro-organic genomics (K024220).
At the highest level of disaggregation more than 1,100 unique activity classes have been
assigned to projects between 1960-2009.2
In addition, the title of the project contains information on the cooperative or non-
cooperative nature of projects. More precisely, cooperative projects are labeled as \Ver-
bundprojekt" or \Verbundvorhaben" marking so-called `joint-projects'. Organizations
that participate in such joint projects agree to a number of regulations among which the
following are the most important (self-translated extract of the information sheet concern-
ing the application of subsidies for joint projects (see BMBF, 2008b)):
2The classication scheme as well as the assignment of projects to activity classes has been subject to
some change over the years (Czarnitzki et al., 2002). For the cross-sectional approach taken in this paper
this does however not causes signicant biases.
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2. Intensive collaboration are the basis for nding solutions.
3. Within the scope of the project, partners grant each other a positive and free-of-
charge covenant on their know-how, copy and intellectual property rights, which
existed before the project's begin.
4. Amongst the project's results inventions have a special status. Extraordinary con-
tributions to an invention have to be acknowledged.
In particular, the rst three points allow for intensive knowledge exchange, while the
fourth point provides incentives for innovation.
Accordingly, two organizations are argued to be cooperate if they participate in the
same joint project because these involve signicant knowledge exchange. We manually
identify such joint projects on the basis of the title entry in the database. In general, it
is a rst indication of a joint project if the title contains words like \Verbundprojekt",
\Verbundvorhaben", \Forschungsverbund", and \Verbund". In other cases projects have
the same title but there is no indication if it is a joint project. This applies to certain
special cases as, for example, the cooperation network created for the analysis of genes
(\Genomforschungsnetz"). In this case, an internet search on the title is conducted to
retrieve additional information. If no denite indication for a joint project is found it is
treated as non-cooperative.
Large projects are frequently divided into work packages (\Teilvorhaben", \Teilpro-
jekt"). In case it is divided into at least two work packages and each work package includes
at least two partners, we only dened those organizations to be linked that participate in
the same work package. An additional necessary requirement for any link to exist is that
two organizations' participation periods in one project must overlap.
From the Foerderkatalog we extracted all entries that refer to ongoing projects in
2001 and 2002.3 The resulting data set comprises 8,201 entries, which corresponds to
4,410 subsidized projects. Of these, about 41% started before 01.01.2001 and about 68%
end after 31.12.2002. On average, a project lasts for about 530.7 days, which is why we
consider two consecutive years for the data selection. The distribution of the length is
however fairly skewed lasting from 2 days to 41 years.
3.2 Denition of network actors
Based on the data dierent denitions of an individual `actor' or `organization' can be ap-
plied. In particular, four unequal denitions are possible. The name of the granted orga-
nization is given as `receiving organization' (\Zuwendungsempf anger"). It is dierentiated
from the executing unit (\Ausf uhrende Stelle"). The latter implies that organizations are
split into subunits, which is not unproblematic. For example, rms might be divided into
3The reason for choosing this time period is that this data has been cleaned in an earlier project as
well as merged with some additional information, e.g., the types of actors. We compared the data to other
periods but did not nd strong variance in terms of project numbers or the share of cooperative projects.
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entries to the next higher level, which is in most cases the rm. For very large rms how-
ever a splitting into dierent business elds seems appropriate. Universities and public
research institutes are the most problematic cases. Sometimes they are disaggregated all
the way down to working groups and chairs (individual professors). If the information is
available we aggregate all universities at the level of institutes, which is a level between
faculties and working groups or professor chairs. In case this information is not given the
faculty level is used instead. Public research organizations are also aggregated at the in-
stitute level (if available). For both instances (receiving organization and executing unit)
information on their geographic location are given, which can also be used in the denition
of an appropriate actor.
We dene the following four scenarios corresponding to dierent denitions of actors.
An illustrative example is moreover provided in appendix A.
Scenario A: In the rst scenario actors are identied by the receiving organization
(\Zuwendungsempf anger") entry, which indicates the organization receiving the subsidies.
This is the most aggregate level resulting in 2,652 actors.
Scenario B: For the second scenario we use the name of the receiving organization but
disaggregated according to the location of the executing unit. In particular large organi-
zations like Siemens AG or the Fraunhofer Society have numerous sub-units / institutes,
which have dierent locations. Of course, applying this disaggregation implies that we
don't dierentiate between sub-units located in one postal code area. Using this approach
we nd 3,026 actors.
Scenario C: In this scenario the name of the executing unit (\Ausf uhrende Stelle") is
used to identify actors. Here we identify 4,426 actors.
Scenario D: Again, we use the name of the executing unit as dening characteristic.
However, we additionally split these actors according to assigned postal code areas. This
results in 4,584 individual actors.
4 Network structure
4.1 The German research network under dierent modes of aggregation
For an analysis, we construct networks subsuming all technologies for the four scenar-
ios dened above and present the resulting descriptive statistics in table 1. The average
project size is 1.8 mill. Euro and as expected, the number of actors is increasing with
disaggregation. We can distinguish four types of actors with the majority being rms.
Universities are important types of players in the domain of public research. Associa-
tions and research institutes are usually public as well but might also be public-private
partnerships or non-prot organizations sponsored by private actors.
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
Number of projects 4410 4410 4410 4410
Average size of project (TEuro) 1801 1801 1801 1801
Number of actors 2652 3026 4426 4584
Number of projects per actor 1.66 1.46 1.00 0.96
Share of rms 0.75 0.70 0.47 0.47
Share of universities 0.09 0.11 0.39 0.38
Share of institutes 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07
Share of associations 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08
Average subsidies rm (TEuro) 1070 1007 1067 1024
Average subsidies universities (TEuro) 6765 4890 933 922
Average subsidies institutes (TEuro) 25455 11196 7463 6800
Average subsidies association (TEuro) 5920 5306 5734 5362
Projectsum Share of rms 26.78% 26.88% 27.72% 27.72%
Projectsum Share of universities 19.85% 20.26% 20.27% 20.27%
Projectsum Share of institutes 27.57% 27.07% 26.22% 26.20%
Projectsum Share of associations 25.80% 25.79% 25.78% 25.80%
Density 0.0027 0.0023 0.0012 0.0011
Number of components 797 966 1513 1576
Size of largest component 1697 1860 2525 2587
Share in largest component 0.6399 0.6147 0.5705 0.5644
Isolates 725 871 1351 1397
Share of Isolates 0.2734 0.2878 0.3052 0.3048
Centralization (degree) 0.2283 0.0662 0.0508 0.0196
Centralization (betweenness) 0.1730 0.0453 0.0818 0.0330
Mean degree 7.2640 6.8956 5.2942 5.1684
Transitivity 0.1889 0.2752 0.4226 0.5027
Average distance 2.9867 3.3801 4.7762 5.1073
Average distance (within MC) 2.9882 3.3818 4.7790 5.1103
Diameter 7 8 12 14
Switching from the aggregation method based on the receiving organization (A and B)
to scenarios based on the conducting organization (C and D) makes a substantial dierence
in the number of universities since they become disaggregated into faculties or institutes.
Depending on the denition, universities receive average subsidies ranging between 0.9
mill. Euro to 6.8 mill. Euro. Irrespective of the scenario, we observe that institutes
receive the largest funding per actor and rms receive considerably less than the typical
non-prot organizations. However, this greatly underestimates rms' contributions to a
project as they are required to provide own additional funding between 10% and 80%
of their grant. Looking at the importance of these four types of actors as measured by
the received funding, we observe roughly equal shares with rms receiving 28 per cent of
the whole funding, universities receiving 20 per cent, and institutes and associations 26
per cent respectively. As such, public research is clearly dominating since institutes and
associations can be either public or non-prot organizations.
Turning to the network statistics, we observe density to be decreasing with disaggre-
gation. This is not surprising given that this measure relates the number of active links to
the number of possible linkages and the latter is always increasing from scenarios A to D.
Interestingly, the share of actors in the largest component (i.e., in the largest connected
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from 63 to 56 per cent. An indication of connectedness is also given by the mean degree,
which is simply the average number relations an actor has. For scenario B, we nd that
on average actors are cooperating with roughly seven other actors, for scenarios C and D
this measure drops to slightly more than ve since the observed entities become smaller.
Important dierences exist in the centralization of the networks4. In scenario A, central-
ization is three to four times higher than in scenarios B and C, which are themselves more
than twice as centralized as the network based on the aggregation heuristic of scenario
D. The reason for the dierences lies in the specicities of the large players such as the
Fraunhofer-Society, which is one actor in scenario A and split up into a multitude of ac-
tors in scenarios B to D. This is documented in the increasing number of institutes from
scenarios A to D and the dramatic increase in the number of universities, especially when
moving to the aggregations based on the conducting organization in scenarios C and D.
Contrary, the number of rms and associations remain rather stable.
We are also interested in distance measures of the network. Average distance tells us
how many steps in the network have to be taken on average to contact any other actor.
Since there is no connection between actors belonging to dierent components this only
makes sense within the main component. The network diameter is the maximum distance
between any two actors in the network. Unsurprisingly, both of these measures increase
with higher disaggregation.5
In the following, we concentrate on scenario B. The reasons for this choice are based
on two rationales: First, in the context of the paper we think it is not appropriate to treat
very large, multi-location rms and institutes as one single actor in which information and
knowledge 
ows freely as it is assumed in scenario A. Second, university institutes and
faculties in one location should be treated as one single actor since we can assume that
there is at least as much knowledge exchange across departments (or even chairs) as takes
place within a rm or institute of comparable size. This would not be the case in scenarios
C and D.6
The biggest surprise to us is the high connectedness of the network observed over
such a short period and across heterogeneous technologies. This opens the question about
which actors connect the network. Table 2 provides us with a rst hint to answering this
question. Here, the mean degree, i.e., the average number of linkages is given by actor
type. Universities and research institutes are clearly the actors connecting the network
with an average degree three times and almost twice as high as the mean degree of rms.
The characteristics of central actors in the network will be analyzed in more detail in
section 5.
4Centralization is a measure of concentration and can be calculated on the basis of dierent measures
of individual level centrality.
5In comparison to random graphs of equal size and tie probabilities (density) leads to signicantly lower
centralization, a larger share of actors in the main component and larger distance measures.
6For other research questions, however the other actor denitions might be more appropriate.
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Type.Actor Mean degree Mean degree Mean degree Mean degree
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
association 1.70 1.63 1.73 1.67
rm 5.92 5.78 5.94 5.79
institute 18.27 10.63 7.87 7.33
university 22.96 18.09 4.84 4.80
4.2 A typology of technological systems (basic vs. applied research)
On the basis of the Leistungsplansystematik we can dierentiate between a number of
funding areas. Overall, there are 22 main elds of subsidizing (see table 3), that dier
substantially in their nature. During our period of observation (2001 and 2002) we can
identify projects funded in 16 research areas as indicated by an `a' in the third column of
table 3. We concentrate on the ten most important ones in terms of relevance for techno-
logical innovation and size according to funding and number of actors. Fields indicated by
a `b' in the third column of table 3 are not considered. For example, large equipment of
basic research is excluded since this type of funding is almost per denition not cooperative
and rather close to institutional funding.
While the classication scheme primarily emphasizes dierences in research topics,
some of the topics capture technological dierences. For instance, the categories K Biotech-
nology, D Space research and technology, and I ICT, seem to have a clear technological
dimension. However, similar cannot be said for categories like H R&D improvement of
working conditions. Accordingly, interpreting these topics as technologies might not be
appropriate in all instances. For this reason we refer to `research areas' in the following.
Clearly, more research is needed for example relating the `Leistungsplansystematik' to
technological classications like the IPC codes used for patent applications and standard
industry classications like the NACE scheme.
Out of the 22, we focus on ten research areas in the following, for which we are
interested if dierences in the involvement of public research organizations translate into
dierences in the structure of the according knowledge networks.
Networks for the ten most important research areas are visualized in gure 4 and the
respective network statistics are given in table 4. The networks are quite heterogeneous
in terms of size but also in terms of structure. The smallest network is in Geoscience
with 39 actors and the largest network includes 1,292 actors in ICT. Structural dierences
are for example visible in the intensity of interaction, i.e., the density of the network.
Table 4 highlights that the number of links (Edges) is apparently quite correlated with
the size of the networks. Therefore, density measures the share of active relations relative
to all possible relations and is usually an accepted measure for the interaction intensity
in a network. The problem with density is that it is also sensitive to the size of the
network (Scott, 2000). Accordingly, this measure is highest in the small technologies of
Biotechnology, Energy, and Geoscience with more than ve per cent.
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Field Research area/Technology Short name Excl. Funding Actors
(Mill. EURO)
A Institutional funding a { 0
B Large equipment of basic research b 103.2 50
C Oceanography and polar research;
oshore technology
Oshore 152.1 73
D Space research and technology b 25.6 4
E Energy Energy 802.6 49
F Environmental research, sustainable
development
Environment 552.6 529
G Health and medical science Medicine 766.3 172
H R&D for the improvement of working
conditions
Work 221.1 420
I Information technology ICT 1798.3 1292
K Biotechnology Biotech 262.0 82
L Materials; phys. and chem. technologies Materials 196.6 241
M Aviation a { 0
N Trac a { 0
O Geoscience and securing resources Geoscience 72.3 39
P Regional and urban planning b 0.2 1
Q Healthy nutrition a { 0
R Sustainability a { 0
S Educational research b 325.0 401
T Innovation, general framework
conditions
a { 0
V Arts and humanities; social sciences b 13.4 15
W Miscellaneous activities Miscellaneous 940.9 497
Y Not R&D-relevant educational spending b 1708.5 78
Reasons for exclusion: a { no data available, b { (almost) no cooperative funding
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between 2.26 in Geoscience and 10.23 in ICT. It is also quite high in Medicine, Biotech-
nology, and Materials. These elds are also those with the highest shares of actors in
the largest component of the networks. Isolates are actors not being engaged in cooper-
ative research at all. The share of isolates provides us with an indication how easy it is
to perform research without external knowledge. In Energy more than 50 percent of all
actors are isolated whereas in ICT this share lies below 10 percent. Centralization is a
measure of concentration of the linkages in the network on few actors. It can be based
on dierent individual measures of centrality, in our case on degree and on betweenness
centrality.7 Energy and Biotechnology are highly centralized networks as well as Medicine
and Oshore. Networks are less concentrated in Miscellaneous activities, Environment,
improvement of Working Conditions, and ICT.
The ten networks clearly show very dierent structures and we can now turn towards
the question if this is related to the a research area's degree of application orientation.
For answering this question, we rst have to nd a measure re
ecting the degree to which
an area involves basic or applied research. A natural approach is to look at the share
of subsidized business rms, which we argue is proportional to the degree of application
orientation. The highest shares are found in Environment, Working Conditions, ICT, and
in Materials. At the other end of this scale are Geoscience, Biotechnology, and Energy
research that accordingly can be regarded basic science. At least for Biotechnology this cor-
responds to similar classications in the literature (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998).
The research areas in table 4 are arranged so that the share of rms in this technology is
increasing from left to right.
In this respect, it is also informative to look at the actual interaction (cooperation in
joint projects) between the private (industrial) and the public science sector. Figure 1
shows the shares of linkages between dierent types of partners and visual inspection re-
veals that the intensity of interaction between science (institutes and universities) and
industries increases with the share of rms. Accordingly, Materials shows the highest
interaction intensity between the two spheres, followed by Miscellaneous activities, En-
vironment and Working Conditions. ICT shows a somewhat lower interaction intensity,
but still on a signicantly higher level than the ve research areas on the left side of the
gure.
However, the possibilities for science-industry relations depend on the distribution of
actors within the two spheres in a non-linear way. Neither without rms nor without
science we could expect such relations. To account for this, we plot the relation between
the share of rms and the share of science-industry relations in gure 2. The dotted
curve gives the theoretical expectations if actors cooperate irrespective of partner type,
i.e., the share of science-industry linkages in a complete graph. The solid curve is retained
from the estimated, quadratic relationship between both variables. We can clearly observe
that research areas with a higher share of rms are closer to the (unbiased) theoretical
7The degree centrality of actor i is the number of its ties divided by the number of possible ties
Ci = di=(g   1). Network centralization is then given by C =
Pg
i=1 (max(Ci)   Ci)=(g   2).
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Figure 1: Shares of linkages between types of actors
expectation, indicating that the propensity for cooperation between science and industry
is increasing with the orientation towards applied research. The second observation is
that across all elds science-industry relations are below the unbiased expectation. Con-
sequently our ndings show a clear bias towards cooperation within the own sphere but
this bias decreases within research areas that have a stronger focus on applied research,
as indicated by the share of rms active in the eld.
In light of these ndings, the share of rms appears as a suitable measure for the
application orientation of a research area. It simultaneously approximates the extent
to which innovation processes are carried out by private rm and the focus of science
organizations on the generation of applied knowledge.
4.3 Basic vs. applied research and network characteristics
Table 4 already reveals that certain network characteristics seem to be related to the
application orientation of research. For instance, as pointed out above, the density of
the network seems to fall with increasing application orientation. However, this may
also be explained by the size of the network (number of nodes). In our search for the
relationship between application orientation and global network structures, we correlate
various properties of the networks (see table 6). The results indicate that networks within
applied research are larger, less centralized, have a higher mean degree, and show a larger
share of actors in the main component. To rene this observation, we perform a principal
component analysis of the ten networks with respect to six network statistics. We chose
density, centralization (betweenness), mean degree, share in the main component, share
of isolates, and lastly the share of rms as indication of the application orientation. The
results of this analysis are presented in gure 3. The two components that are plotted in
the gure explain almost 85 percent of the variance between network characteristics. Those
elds with a focus on application are positioned in the top left corner of the plot, while
those closer to basic science are in the bottom right. Medicine appears to be between the
14






























































Figure 2: Linkages between rms and public research. The dotted line represents the share of
linkages between rms and public research if they are formed irrespective of the type of partner.
The points are the actual shares and the solid line is a quadratic t.
typical applied and basic research networks while, unsurprisingly, Miscellaneous activities
do not t too well into this typology as it appears to be a conglomerate of applied and
basic research.
The gure clearly reveals that the nature of the technological problems shapes the
overall structure of cooperation networks. Within basic research, networks involve more
isolates, are more centralized, and are more dense (due to their smaller size). The latter
conrms the results of Broekel and Boschma (2010). Following their argument, a higher
degree of codication and unrestricted access to (public) knowledge reduces the obstacles
for cooperation. Similarly interesting is the trend for higher betweenness centralization in
basic research networks. It means, that there are few crucial actors that hold the network
together, i.e., connecting actors that are unconnected otherwise or only at a larger geodesic
distance. Not surprisingly, this role seems to be played by universities. In contrast, the
share of actors in the main component seems to be unrelated to the degree of application
orientation. Similar applies to the mean degree, which seems to depend less on the basic-
applied research dichotomy than we would have expected from existing work arguing for
more cooperation activities in basic research (Broekel and Boschma, 2010).
As a general nding of this exercise it follows that research areas dier in their general
network structure. Applied research, characterized by a large share of rms active in the
eld, is to a larger extent performed through cooperation as indicated by the low share
of isolates. These networks are also larger, leading to a lower density, while the average
number of cooperation partners does not seem to fall into this dichotomy. Basic research
deals with topics tackling goals of national foresight (e.g., Energy, Medicine) in which large
15





















































Figure 3: Biplot of principal component analysis of research networks
public research organizations are installed by the state to perform this research leading to
a higher centralization.
5 Explanation of degree centrality
5.1 Network autoregression
Having explored the relationship between application orientation and the general structure
of knowledge networks, we now take a more actor-oriented viewpoint. More precisely, we
explore the characteristics of central actors and how they dier between basic and applied
research. Given the explorative nature of our work, in the following we focus on the most
simple representation of actor centrality: degree centrality (Cd).
In order to test the relevance of actors' characteristics on their degree centrality we
use a network autocorrelation model. Accounting for network autocorrelation is necessary
because network data violates a central assumption of standard regressions namely inde-
pendent observations. The network characteristics of one actor are not independent of an
other actors' network attributes.
The use of so-called network autocorrelation models allows circumventing this problem
(see, e.g., Anselin, 1988; Leenders, 2002). Here the regression model is specied by
y = W1  y +   X + e;e = W2  e +  (1)
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1i  W1i and W2 =
q X
i=1
2i  W2i (2)
with W1i and W2i as the elements of one or two network adjacency matrices. In this
sense W1 and W2 describe the relationships between nodes in the network. 1 can be
regarded as an autoregression parameter (AR) that parameterizes the autoregression of
each y value on its neighbors in the network W1. 2 captures the moving average (MA)
and parameterizes the autocorrelation of each disturbance in y on its neighbors in network
W2. It accounts for an incorrect or misspecied unit of analysis (Anselin and Bera, 1988).
In addition, 2 may also take into account eects when certain events or shocks diuse
through the entire network.
In this paper we are interested in degree centrality as the dependent variable. As
pointed out above, this measure is constructed by dividing the absolute number of an
actor's links by the number of possible links. This transforms the count variable (degree)
into a proportion (standardized degree) implying that it is bounded in the interval [0; 1].





To explore dierences between applied and basic research the regressions are separately
conducted for each of the ten research areas.
5.2 Denition of determinants
The following variables are dened to represent actors' most important characteristics, i.e.,
factors that might determine their centrality in knowledge networks. For these variables
we test if they explanatory power of an actor's degree centrality diers between networks
of basic and applied research.
We don't have any reliable information on actors' R&D activities, which are however
very likely the most important determinant of an actor applying and receiving R&D subsi-
dies. Accordingly, these activities determine the projects' sizes and the number of projects
an actor is engaged in. In order to control for this eect we assume that an actors' R&D
activities can be approximated by the totaled amount of received grants per day to control
for the length of the projects). To be more precise, we split the variable into cooperative
R&D grants (Grant co.) and non-cooperative R&D grants (Grant no-co.). This allows
dierentiating between actors for whom cooperative applications are relevant and actors
that receive primarily non-cooperative subsidies. Such endeavor implies that we neglect
all performance dierences concerning the success in acquiring R&D subsidies. Based on
this assumption we interpret all other factors to explain the deviation from the expected
degree, which is determined by the received amount of subsidies per day. The bivariate
correlation between these variables and the degree supports this approach, see table 7 in
17
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The received non-cooperative grants are strongly negatively correlated with degree cen-
trality ( 0:6). Of course, this very high correlation is more or less induced by the
construction of the variables as degree as well as received cooperative grants depend on
the number of cooperation projects actors are engaged in. Again, it is not our aim to ex-
plain the intensity of cooperation but rather the network position of an actor controlling
for his possibilities to cooperate. Accordingly, the bivariate correlations already reveal
that those actors strongly engaged in applying for non-cooperative grants show below av-
erage degrees while the opposite is true for actors that primarily apply for cooperative
grants.
In Section 3 we pointed out that the length of projects varies greatly. This hints at
the existence of structurally heterogenous projects, which range from support for organiz-
ing meetings not longer than two days to the creation of new R&D jobs for many years.
An actors' involvement in such structurally dierent projects is approximated with the
average length of an actors' projects. Our primary focus is on actors' cooperation activi-
ties, wherefore we consider only cooperative projects for the construction of this variable
(Length co.). Although it is estimated as the mean over all cooperative projects it still
tends to increase with size and number of projects an actor is engaged in, which is visible
in the strong correlation of this variable with Grant co. Since shorter projects absorb less
resources, they leave more possibilities for a variety of cooperations and consequently we
expect Length co. to in
uence centrality in a negative way.
While we don't have information on the size of universities and research organizations,
the size of rms is approximated with their number of employees. As such, employment
can be interpreted as an interaction term between employment and the rm dummy. We
have to point out though that this information is far from complete (large number of
empty values) and the employment numbers are only available at the most aggregate level
of the receiving organization (\Zuwendungsempf anger"). Accordingly, all subsidiaries of
a rm have the same employment number corresponding to the rm's total employment.
Quite naturally, we expect larger rms to hold more central positions. Note furthermore
that the variables accounting for the received subsidies are also likely to capture some size
eects as large organizations have more resources to be simultaneously active in multiple
projects.
Two variables are included that account for actors being universities (Univ.) or rms
(Firm) as opposed to the heterogenous control group (e.g., research organizations and
associations). In particular, universities are often shown to be central actors, at least in
regional networks (Graf and Henning, 2009). In the chosen Scenario B, universities are
furthermore treated as single actors aggregating all their faculties and institutes. Obvi-
ously, we expect universities to be more central in basic research while rms should be the
central players in applied research (see, e.g., Niosi and Banik, 2005). Research institutes
and associations cannot be as clearly assigned to one or the other orientation as they are
quite heterogenous with respect to their research focus. They are therefore employed as
control group.
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number of regional dummies. Large multinational rms are particularly located in Munich,
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Berlin, which is why dummies for these regions are constructed.
Another dummy is created capturing if an actor is located on the territory of the former
GDR, i.e., in the Neue L ander. These regions still suer from the troublesome starting
conditions after the German reunication, during which organizational structures have
been distorted and established relationships were broken (see for a discussion Fritsch and
Graf, 2010). Nevertheless, East German organizations seem to engage more actively in
collaboration than their West German counterparts (Cantner and Meder, 2008) and tend
to show a stronger focus on intra-regional relationships (Beise and Stahl, 1999). Moreover,
East German organizations might be preferred by policy incentive schemes to accelerate
the catching-up process, which may also lead to higher average centrality (Czarnitzki and
Hussinger, 2004).
We also consider variables covering the funding history to account for previous success
in the acquisition of R&D subsidies since the likelihood of an actor participating in mul-
tiple projects is foremost determined by its ability to produce high quality applications.
This quality is not only dependent on an actor's technological superiority but also on its
capability to write excellent proposals, nd appropriate cooperation partners, and coordi-
nate their contributions. A good track record and a positive image of being a trustworthy
cooperation partner should also increase the chances to participate in multiple projects.
Past experience is a dummy indicating if an actor has previously received R&D subsidies.
Similarly, past degree refers to the degree centrality of an actor in the subsidies network
existing between 01.01.1991 and 31.12.2000.8 This variable captures three eects. Firstly,
the more central an actor has been in the past, the more visible it is for future cooperation
partners. The actor may hence build up a certain reputation for participating in particu-
lar funding schemes. Secondly, similar to the previous variable past degree captures past
experience in subsidies programs. Thirdly, as for the case of East German rms, some
policy programs may be designed to support a specic group of actors resulting in higher
degrees of these actors. It is however beyond the scope of the paper to disentangle these
eects.
The last variable is the number of research areas an actor is active in. This accounts
for an actor's diversication and engagement in dierent research areas (i.e., technologies).
While we expect diversication to increase with size (employment) the two variables are
only weakly positive correlated (see table 7 in the appendix) This is probably because of
missing employment data for universities, research institutes, and associations. Instead,
universities are engaged in above average numbers of research areas. We pointed out before
that this is caused by the heterogeneity of universities, which are not split into faculties.
8For the construction of this network we used automatic name matching procedures including fuzzy
string matching.
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The results of the regressions on actors' degree centralities for each research area are shown
in table 5. The model ts (adj. R2) are satisfying. With the exceptions of Energy and
Medicine they are well above 0.4 and even reach 0.7 for three research areas. The signi-
cance of the 1 and 2 parameters in most models highlights that network autocorrelation
is present. This comes at no surprise given the existence of a large main component in all
research areas' networks (see section 4).
The discussion of our results is organized in a way to separate more general ndings
that apply in all research areas from those results that allow us to identify characteristic
dierences with respect to the orientations towards basic or applied research. First, we
take a brief look at factors that determine actors' degree centrality equally in all networks.
Subsequently, we discuss factors that systematically dier between the networks.
5.3.1 General ndings
Meeting our expectations, cooperative funding per day (Grant co.) is positively signicant
in all models, suggesting that actors following a cooperative strategy when applying for
R&D subsidies take more central positions in the network. The negative coecient for
non-cooperative funding (Grant no-co.) additionally underlines this point. Actors either
apply for cooperative or for non-cooperative subsidies implying that actors following the
latter strategy are isolates in the R&D networks. In line with our expectations, the length
of cooperative projects (Length co.) is negative signicant in almost all research areas. The
only research area with a positive coecient is ICT. This indicates that with the exception
of ICT, shorter project lengths generally lead to more collaboration and consequently
higher centrality. Hence, reducing the length of projects might be an appropriate strategy
to stimulate collaboration between dierent partners.
With respect to the regional dummies for agglomerations strong in science and high-
tech industries (Munich, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart) the results clearly contrast our
expectations. In the (rare) signicant cases we only observe negative coecients, which
is especially puzzling in the case of Biotechnology where Munich was one of the winners
of the BioRegio contest, a policy measure directly aimed at fostering cooperation on a
regional level (Dohse, 2000). Apart from that, our results imply that we can rule out
critical biases arising from the suspected `headquarter' eect. We very likely control for
this eect by taking into account the location of the executing unit in the actor denition
(see section 3.2).
We don't observe any indication for East German actors being more cooperative than
their West German counterparts. To the contrary and against our hypothesis, actors
in East Germany show signicantly smaller degree centralities than their West German
counterparts in six research areas. In case of ICT our results add to the critique on the
BMBF to have failed its objectives in East Germany (see Zumpe, 2002). While our data
does not allow us to assess if the subsidies added to a decrease in the technological gap
between the two parts of Germany, our ndings imply that cooperation was not stimulated
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(Powell et al., 1996) this can also be interpreted as a policy failure.
The size of the technology portfolio (# Tech.) shows signicant negative coecients
in ve research areas, including basic research areas Oshore and Energy as well as rather
applied research areas Working Conditions, ICT, and Materials. As such, no clear relation
with our basic vs. applied dichotomy can be reported. This variable is however highly
correlated with the university dummy and non-cooperative grants. Accordingly, diversi-
ed organizations (such as universities) do not engage in many cooperations within one
research area. Most likely this is due to their cooperative engagements being spread over
dierent elds. While this may seem logical if we assume that organizations can handle
only a limited number of cooperations it has a strong implication: Organizations that
bridge dierent research areas are not the most central actors when separately looking at
each research area. It suggests that research areas (i.e., technologies) constitute separate
networks that are linked by few actors. The nding explains also why universities have
the highest mean degree of all types of actors (see table 2) while in the regressions being
a university goes along with a below average degree.
With respect to persistency in the research networks, past degree never becomes sig-
nicant and accordingly we cannot put it into relation with the degree of application
orientation. The reason for the low signicance levels of this variables appears to be the
low number of positive values, which is an interesting result on its own. Out of 3,026
actors present in all research areas' networks, only 371 are characterized by nonzero past
degree values.
5.3.2 Dierences between basic and applied research
Apart from our general ndings, a number of factors determining actors' degree centrality
seem to dier between basic and applied research areas. The coecient for Universities
is signicantly negative within ve research areas, which implies that universities in these
research elds are on average less central than our control group of research institutes and
associations. These ve areas can be regarded as rather applied since they are among
the six research areas with the highest share of rms. Among these, only in Materials
universities do not seem to dier from the control group with respect to centrality. Overall,
this implies that the control group is more central than universities in applied but not in
basic research. This concerns in particular the generally perceived prominent position held
by applied research institutes, such as the Fraunhofer society, within the German national
system. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to control for size eects, which might
in
uence this result as well. Nevertheless, this does not mean that universities do not
cooperate in applied research. There are a number of universities that are very important
in these networks as well. For example, the Katholische Universit at Eichst att-Ingolstadt
and the University of Potsdam are highly central in the network of ICT.
On average, rms are characterized by relatively smaller grants and they cover less
research areas than universities and the control group. This is controlled for, which is
why the Firm dummy can be used to identify dierences between the three types of
21





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 078organizations. When analyzing the rm dummy from left to right in table 5, i.e., from
basic to applied research areas, it shows that rms become decreasingly central. In the
most basic eld, Geoscience, the coecient is positive and signicant, within Biotech and
Energy it is insignicant, and it turns negative within the most applied elds. However,
this eect has to be discussed against the background of the coecient of Employment.
As acknowledged above, we have employment data only for rms. Therefore, Employment
captures some of the rm eect, especially in elds with large variances in rm size that
tends to increase with the share of rms.
Firm size, in terms of employment, is signicant only in four out of ten research areas.
We nd a negative in
uence on degree centrality in two basic research areas (Energy,
Geoscience) and a positive in
uence in two applied elds (ICT, Work). Taking the eects
of the Firm dummy and of Employment together leads us to the following interpretation.
Despite the positive coecient, rms are less central in basic research, since this eect
is captured by employment, which is negative. In applied research, rms are not more
central per se (negative rm dummy) but only if they are suciently large (positive eect
of employment). This is not coming at any surprise as large rms benet from having
more resources and a higher absorptive capacity, which allows them to identify more
opportunities to cooperate as well as manage and exploit their networks (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Our results are also inline with the empirical evidence on the basis of
patent application data (see, e.g., Giuri and Mariani, 2005). Despite the strong focus of
the BMBF on small and medium-sized rms (see BMBF, 2002) the result indicates that
there is no bias towards smaller rms in the granting policy of cooperative R&D subsidies.
Another in
uence that diers between basic and applied research is past experience.
The dummy indicating if an actor previously received a subsidy grant becomes signicant
in three applied research areas (Environment, ICT, Miscellaneous). Accordingly, we argue
that in application oriented research areas past degree is negatively impacting degree
centrality, which is somewhat surprising. There are a number of explanations for the
negative eects of this variable. From a pessimistic viewpoint one can argue that actors
either have experienced negative eects of cooperation in the past or that they have
proven to be non-reliable cooperation partners and the bad reputation is now preventing
them from getting access to new cooperative projects. In contrast, a more optimistic
interpretation is that subsidies are not always granted to the same organizations. Be
it because the goals of the subsidy programs change or that organizations fail to install
eective lobbying activities giving them continuous access to subsidies. However, the
variable is troubled by a low number of positive values. Out of 3.395 total actors present
in all technologies' networks, only 497 are identied to have received subsidies before. As
such, the low persistence might also be due to a higher turbulence characterizing elds
with many rms.
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With the present study, we pursued two research objectives. First, we introduced a novel
data source for the analysis of cooperations in R&D and resulting network structures.
Second, we apply this data to show that knowledge networks dier systematically between
technologies.
The increasing interest of academe and policy in structures of interaction within the
innovation process calls for high quality network data that not only covers technological
and geographical dimensions but also allows for longitudinal network studies. We pre-
sented a new data source that fullls these criteria and can be seen as complimentary to
the heavily used patent and publication data. The presented data covers R&D coopera-
tions that received subsidies from the German federal government. It is very rich in detail
and freely available, however it has rarely been used for the research on cooperation net-
works. While all available secondary network data have their drawbacks, R&D subsidies
are subject to the political decision to subsidize R&D in particular elds and according
to certain granting schemes. For this reason, results based on subsidy data have to be
interpreted with care and it remains to be explored if (and how) the observed network
structures are `designed' by policy. Comparing networks based on R&D subsidies with
networks constructed from alternative data sources, e.g., patents, publications, seems to
be a natural approach for shedding light on this issue.
However, compared to other network data, data on subsidies also has some important
advantages as it covers technologies at an earlier stage of the innovation process and in
dierent areas of research than patents. For example, technologies in which patents are
useful means of appropriating returns to R&D are characterized by lower degrees of market
failure since the produced good (knowledge) is made private through patent protection.
Industries with intense patenting should therefore not be extensively subsidized by public
policy. For elds in which patenting is less common, we might distinguish two cases. In
the rst case, other means of appropriation are viable and apparently more appropriate
to grasp the fruits of innovation. In such cases there is also no need for subsidies. Conse-
quently, we would only cover parts of these systems with either patent or subsidies data.
In the second case, appropriability is limited and externalities are especially high calling
for public intervention. These are the areas of the national innovation system that are
better grasped by subsidies data than by patents. Accordingly, we argue that data on
subsidies is to be viewed as a type of secondary network data, which has its 
aws just like
other types of publicly available data on networks (patents, publications) but additionally
serves as a tool for the analysis of public policy towards research and development.
With respect to our second objective, we extended the existing body of research by
comparing knowledge networks in ten technologies concerning global network properties
and characteristics of central actors. We showed that knowledge networks in basic research
areas are considerably dierent from knowledge networks concerning application oriented
research. In particular, networks in basic research are smaller, more centralized, and
more dense but involve more isolates. In applied research large rms and public research
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relevance.
However, our study only marks a starting point for further research as knowledge
networks could be classied according to multiple dimensions with the degree of application
orientation being just one. For instance, future investigations may explore if knowledge
networks in related technologies are more similar than knowledge networks in unrelated
elds, thereby introducing the nature of the knowledge base and the related search process
as a determinant of interaction structures. Similarly interesting is the impact of varying
geographical, institutional, and organizational settings. A major challenge also exists
in the integration of the macro-level approach, i.e., global network properties, with the
rich literature focusing on the micro level, i.e., characteristics of the dyads. Accordingly,
it is not sucient to explain network formation for a particular case (industry, region,
technology), but we require more comparative studies, which add to our understanding of
the driving forces behind network formation from a macro and from a micro perspective.
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In our example we observe 4 institutes (Inst A to D), all belonging to the same society (Inst),
one university department (with 2 Profs), and one rm with two subsidiaries. ZE is the receiving
organization, AS the organization conducting the research, AO is the location of the conducting
organization and PRJ is the identication of the project.
Example data
ZE AS AO PRJ
Inst Inst A 1 A
Inst Inst B 1 B
Inst Inst C 2 C
Inst Inst D 3 D
Uni Prof A 2 A
Uni Department A 2 E
Uni Department A 2 F
Uni Prof B 2 C
Firm Firm 1 B





























Inst A 1 1
Inst B 1 1
Inst C 2 1
Inst D 3 1
Prof A 2 1
Department A 2 2
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O − Geoscience and Securing Resources K − Biotechnology
E − Energy C − Oceanography and Polar Research; Offshore Technology
G − Health and Medical Science W − Miscellaneous Activities
Figure 4: Network representations in dierent research areas
Note: Firms { black triangle, Association { red square, Institute { green hexagon, University {
blue circle, node size is proportional to the amount of funding received
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 078L − Materials; Phys. and Chem. Technologies F − Sustainable Development
H − R&D for the Improvement of Working Conditions I − Information Technology
Figure 4 continued
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